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Dimensions of
Supply Chain Security
James A. Pope
In a recent column in
The Wall Street Journal,
executives were urged to
focus on four priorities
based on the events of the
summer of 2007. At the top
of the list was “Make
supply-chain management a
top priority.” The story went
on to say, “Don’t wait for a
crisis” (Hymowitz, 2007).
Much of the story focused
on supply chain security.
There has been a lot
written on supply chain
vulnerability during crises
or disasters such as the
9-11 terrorist attack in 2001
or natural disasters such as
hurricane Katrina (e.g.,
Melnyk et.al., 2005). Not
much attention has been
paid to day-to-day supply
chain security. As supply
chains reach around the
globe, potential security
concerns are present every
day. The focus of this article
will be on developing a
framework for the topic.
Given a framework, it
should then be possible for
organizations to develop
strategies and tactics for
supply chain security.
Supply chain security
has four dimensions:
a. security of the product
or service
b. security of the
information flows
c. security of the money
flows
d. security of the logistics
systems
Let us look at each
dimension in turn, provide a
description and give
examples, both good and
bad.
The Product or
Service
Security of the product or
service itself has several
dimensions. Underlying all
of them is the question
which the customers
(meaning each successive
link in the supply chain)
must ask continually: “Am I
getting what I ordered or
expected?” Pharmaceutical
companies, for example,
have elaborate procedures
to insure that cheap
generics or even placebos
are not substituted for high
value drugs at some point in
the distribution system
(Zoellner, 2007). Their
efforts are intended to
insure that the end
customer receives the
medication that he or she is
expecting. If this does not
happen, lives and the
company’s reputation are at
risk. Pills are small, easily
counterfeited and easy to
conceal. The more people
who handle the drug before
it reaches the consumer, the
greater the risk of a security
breach.
A company may receive
the products it ordered from
a supplier, but the products
may not be made to
specifications. Stories of
toys painted with lead based
paint from China have made
for sensational headlines.
(Casey, 2007). Again,
people’s health and lives as
well as companies’
reputations are at risk from
such a security breach.
Ironically, the lead in the
paint came largely from
recycled electronic goods
shipped to China from the
U.S. (Fairclough, 2007).
Products may not be
made to the quality
standards that have been
specified, or cheaper
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substitute raw materials or
components may have been
used. Products received may
contain illegally obtained
components, either through
outright theft or the theft of
intellectual property. You
may think you have an
original product, but find
that you have a knock-off
instead. Colgate warned
consumers about authentic
looking tubes of their
toothpaste that were labeled
“Made in South Africa”
(where Colgate does not
manufacture toothpaste).
The toothpaste was
contaminated with
diethylene glycol (DEG), the
same poison found in
Chinese toothpaste (Colgate,
2007). Or, suppliers may
simply cheat. One local
businessman reported
receiving a container full of
rocks instead of steel from a
Korean supplier.
Sometimes the length or
complexity of the supply
chain makes security
difficult. For the agricultural
product ginger, China
accounts for 53.8 percent of
U.S. imports. In July 2007,
ginger contaminated with
the pesticide aldifarb
sulfoxide, a chemical which
can cause adverse reactions
in humans, was discovered
in a California food store.
The investigators uncovered
seven links in the supply
chain from the farmers in
China to the retail store.
Discovering the actual
source of the contamination
was virtually impossible
since for any given
shipment arriving in a food
store, the links in the
supply chain may be
different each time
(Zamiska, 2007).
Even in the highly regulated
pharmaceutical industry
problems can arise with
contaminated products.
Shipments of Heparin from
China, made from pig
intestines and used in blood
thinners, were
contaminated (Fairclough et
al., 2008). It took months to
trace the source of the
contamination.
The service industry is
not exempt from security
issues. Many companies
have found themselves in
trouble with the INS
because their suppliers were
using undocumented
workers. (160 Illegal, 2007)
Or, do the subcontractors
have the skills they claim to
have? Countries such as
Germany with a long history
of guilds are stricter about
the licensing of service
providers than we are in the
U.S. We have an array of
licensing and bonding
procedures to try to insure
integrity (but not necessarily
competence) in the service
supply chain, but these vary
widely from locality to
locality; and, in fact, how
often do we actually check
these things?
In addition to these
upstream issues,
downstream the customer
wants to feel secure that he
or she is receiving the
service expected. Often this
may involve communication
or miscommunication with
no fraud involved. For
example, anyone who has
opened a bank account in
another country knows the
feeling of insecurity as to
what exactly is involved. The
Citizens Bank in New
England (a subsidiary of the
Royal Bank of Scotland)
addressed this in Boston by
printing their marketing
materials and account
information in Chinese.
They wanted the large
number of Chinese students
in Boston universities to feel
secure as customers in the
supply chain (Lee, 2007).
Information
Security of the
information flows is a well
known problem. Since much
of the information these
days flows by electronic
means, the data must be
protected from corruption,
malicious altering, or theft.
Fortunately, electronic
transactions are now so
ubiquitous that this
problem is being worked on
constantly, although not
always successfully. In
global supply chains, there
are so many issues other
than security related to
information flows such as
timing, measurement
systems, language, and so
on, that security is often a
relatively low priority. As a
result, we hear stories of
information on customers
which is processed in
off-shore facilities being
stolen and sold to
competitors. Electronic
information gathering is
ubiquitous (Flynn, 2007).
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Information, however, is not
always electronic. The
Boston Globe wrapped its
newspapers and those of a
sister newspaper (both are
owned by the New York
Times Company) in paper
containing the names and
credit card information on
240,000 of their subscribers
and left them on the streets
for anyone to pick up
(Gavin, 2006).
From 2006 to 2007, the
theft of personal data
tripled. More than 162
million records were
reported lost or stolen in
2007, most in the U.S.
where disclosure laws make
it easier to track incidents.
Arrests or prosecutions were
reported in only 19 of these
cases. The source of the
losses ranged over schools,
companies, government
agencies and health
organizations (Acohido,
2007).
In addition to the
problem of organizations
failing to protect their data
adequately, a major problem
is the failure of employees to
take security seriously.
Employees tend to value
data according to the cost of
the medium on which it is
stored. For example,
workers in the British tax
agency sent (and lost) two
computer disks (of nominal
intrinsic value) through
inter-office mail. The data
on the disks had a street
value of $2.5 billion.
(Worthen, 2007) To make
things worse, the apology
letter sent to the ‘victims’
contained unnecessary
confidential information.
(They sent 25 million letters
which means that many of
them did not get to the
intended recipient.) A
further review showed that
data had been lost from the
same office eight times since
2005 (Learning, 2007).
The proliferation of
laptop computers in
organizations is increasing
the security problems.
Laptops are routinely taken
out of the office (exposing
them to the risk of outright
theft) and connected to the
home organization’s central
computer through a variety
of sources from home
connections to wi-fi
connections in hotels and
airports (increasing the
chances of the data being
intercepted). Booz Allen
Hamilton, for example, is
supplying most of its 20,000
employees with laptops.
Parts of the U.S. Treasury
Department have up to 80
percent notebook computers
in their computer mix.
Millions of laptops are lost
or stolen every year; one in
twenty is recovered. Eighty
percent of businesses report
losing one or more laptops
with sensitive information
on an annual basis (Charny,
2007). External threats are
not the only problem. In the
past ten years, the IRS has
opened 4700 investigations
into the illegal use of
taxpayer information by its
employees. The cases
ranged from simple curiosity
to selling the information to
third parties to blackmail
and extortion (Herman,
2007). IT shops are having
to rethink how they
maintain security of their
hardware and the data
contained in their machines
in an environment in which
it is increasingly easy to lose
the data through theft or
negligence.
The primary methods of
electronic data protection
are passwords and PINs.
Both are subject to an array
of problems ranging from
forgetting and sharing to
outright theft. A recent poll
in the U.S., for example,
found that the most
commonly used password is
‘password.’ (10 Most
Common, 2008) More
advanced biometric methods
such as fingerprints and
retina scans have a higher
degree of security, but
require specialized (and
relatively expensive)
equipment. The most recent
development which shows
great promise is the
methodology requiring the
user to type in a string of
characters (such as a
sentence). This is matched
with a profile the user has
entered earlier. If there is a
match, the user is allowed
access to the system. The
Psylock method developed
in Germany (Bartmann, et
al., 2007b) is based on
thirteen different biometric
parameters. It cannot be
shared because the user
cannot verbalize the
parameters. It can even do
ordinary tasks such as
resetting passwords to avoid
the practice of stealing
passwords by falsely
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requesting a new one
(Bartmann et al., 2007a). In
addition to its high degree of
security and simplicity, the
other advantages are that it
requires no specialized
equipment, and works
anywhere there is a
connection back to the
central computer.
Money
Security of the money
flows is often mixed in with
the information flows. A
prime example of this is
credit cards. The use of
credit cards exposes the
users (both payer and
payee) to the risk of the
payment being diverted.
Additionally, the use of
credit cards exposes the
payee to the risk that the
personal data required to
complete the transaction
will be stolen and used to
make purchases without the
owner’s knowledge, or even
used to steal the owner’s
identity. The largest
publicized case of this
happening recently is the
TJX security breach.
Through poor security
measures, TJX exposed at
least 45.7 million credit
card users to hackers. Their
encryption protocol was
weaker than that
recommended for home wi-fi
systems, and they retained
the data too long (increasing
the probability of a security
breach). (Pereira, 2007)
Even if none of the data are
used illegally, there is a
significant cost to the banks
which must reissue credit
cards to their customers at
a cost of around $20 per
card. TJX agreed to pay Visa
and its banks up to $49.5
million to cover these costs.
(Banks O.K., 2007) For a
relatively small investment
in better security measures,
management could have
avoided not only the
payment to Visa, but also
the continuing bad
publicity.
Elaborate systems have
evolved to protect both the
buyer and the seller in
international commerce.
Devices such as letters of
credit were developed in an
age when communication
was by written document or
telex and funds were
transferred from bank to
bank as a result of manual
instructions from bank
employees. In the electronic
age, individuals are able to
make transfers around the
world from their banks to
virtually any other banks.
This ease of access to the
system means there is a
greater chance of
misdirected transactions,
lost transactions, or
fraudulent transactions.
Both the buyers and sellers
must have confidence that
they will receive their goods
or payments if a system of
international commerce is to
work.
The problem of money
security is becoming
exacerbated as more
non-traditional
organizations function as
banks. In parts of the
developing world, for
example, the mobile phone
companies are performing
functions, such as
transferring funds, that are
traditionally done by banks.
At times, even, the medium
of exchange is mobile phone
minutes. (A Bank, 2007) As
funds flow through media
such as mobile phone
networks instead of
traditional channels,
security of the money flows
becomes an increasing
problem.
Supply chains do not
always operate within the
legal system. The flow of
drugs from South America
to the U.S. is through a
complex, well organized
supply chain. To keep the
flow of money back to
Columbia secure, the
organizations have begun
using the legitimate banking
system. They hire teams of
workers to take bundles of
cash to automatic teller
machines (ATMs) in New
York, making small deposits
in each to avoid detection by
the system. The
organization in Columbia
then uses the ATMs in
Columbia to withdraw the
funds. (Schoofs, 2007) This
avoids the problem of
having to carry large
amounts of cash out of the
U.S. (which must be
reported), or engaging in
complicated laundering
operations. In other words,
they have found a secure
method of letting their
money flow through the
supply chain.
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Logistics
Security of the logistics
system is becoming ever
more important. The most
blatant of the problems is
piracy. A ship with relief
supplies for Somalia, for
example, never left the port
in Kenya after being warned
of pirates (Ship Stays Put,
2007). A French cruise ship
was seized by pirates in the
same region (Pirates Seize
French Ship, 2008). Piracy
is common in the narrow
straits between Singapore
and the Philippines. Many
heavily traveled shipping
routes pass through areas
where war or violence is
common or a threat.
Examples are the Strait of
Hormuz or the Horn of
Africa. Ninety-five percent of
the world’s trade, valued at
$6 trillion in 2007, travels
by water. The annual
plunder by pirates is
estimated to be in the
billions. “Ships and their
crews disappear on the high
seas and coastal waters
every year, never to be seen
again.” The problem is bad
enough that the
International Maritime
Bureau has established a
piracy reporting and rescue
center in Kuala Lumpur.
The U.S. Navy is active in
responding to calls for help
both directly and through
the center (Raffaele, 2007).
Another change that is
causing increasing security
problems is the size of
ships. Larger ships are
unable or have difficulty
navigating traditional
shipping routes. Ships that
cannot go through the
Panama Canal, for example,
must go around Cape Horn
or the Strait of Magellan,
both treacherous. Ships
sailing from the west coast
of the U.S. or Canada to
Asia travel a great circle
route near Alaska, again
treacherous. Or, the East
Indies, in addition to
harboring pirates, have
waters that are shallow and
passages that are narrow.
Larger ships also run the
risk of losing more cargo if
there is an accident.
Examples are oil spills from
running aground or
containers falling off ships.
Estimates of the number of
containers that fall off ships
each year range from 2000
to 10,000. An example so
well known that it appeared
in Ripley’s “Believe it or Not”
happened in 1992 when one
container full of 28,800
bathtub toys fell off a ship
in the Pacific Ocean (When
Cargo, 2006).  Ocean-
ographers have used the
toys to track ocean
currents. Some of the toys
actually floated to the
Atlantic Ocean.
The basic problem
seems to be that shippers
consider only the economies
of increasingly larger ships.
If they considered the
trade-off between size and
security, they might prefer
smaller ships which are less
at risk from treacherous
waters because they draw
less water and pirates
because they are faster and
more maneuverable.
Another alternative for
larger ships is to avoid
routes such as the Panama
Canal altogether. For
example, containers may be
off-loaded on one side of
Panama and transported to
the other side where they
are reloaded on another
ship. On the other hand,
this involves additional
handling which implies
greater security risk of loss
or damage.
Conclusion
All supply chains,
internal or external,
domestic or global, have
four dimensions of security.
As supply chains expand
around the globe, and firms
know less about their
suppliers and have less
contact with them, they, the
firms, must be aware of the
dimensions and devise ways
of managing them.
Overlooking any one of
these dimensions can result
in anything from a minor
inconvenience to injury or
death. How deeply into the
supply chain one should
exercise some control is a
real question. The
just-in-time philosophy, for
example, says that we
should trust our suppliers.
The appropriate level of
trust for a supplier in the
same town or country,
however, may not be
appropriate for one half-way
around the world. Should a
firm care if its container is
traveling around the Cape of
Good Hope or going through
the Suez Canal, as long as it
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arrives when promised?
With the framework of
the dimensions of supply
chain security we have
presented, an organization
can partition its security
concerns into manageable
units and organize its efforts
to protect itself, its
customers, and its
suppliers.
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